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Abstract
Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) systems have seen extensive
study for more than two decades, yet we lack a principled
strategy for testing BFT implementations. This paper presents
Twins, a new approach for testing BFT systems. The main
idea of Twins is that we can emulate Byzantine behavior by
running two (or generally up to k) instances of a node with
the same identity. Each of the two instances (or twins) runs
unmodified, correct code.
The Twins approach requires only a thin network wrapper
that delivers messages to/from both twins. To the rest of the
system, the twins appear indistinguishable from a single node
behaving in a ‘questionable’ manner.
Twins generates ‘interesting’ Byzantine behaviors, includ-
ing equivocation, double voting, and losing internal state,
while forgoing ‘uninteresting’ behaviors that are trivially re-
jected by honest nodes, such as producing semantically invalid
messages. Building on this idea, Twins can systematically
generate Byzantine attack scenarios at scale, execute them in a
controlled manner, and check for desired protocol properties.
The paper demonstrates that Twins successfully reinstates
several famous attacks on BFT protocols. In all cases, proto-
cols break within fewer than a dozen protocol steps, hence
it is realistic for the Twins approach to expose the problems.
In two of these attacks, it took the community more than
a decade to discover protocol flaws that Twins would have
surfaced within minutes. Additionally, Twins testing was
successfully incorporated into a production setting in which
Twins executed 3M Twins-generated scenarios, and exposed
(self-injected) subtle safety bugs within minutes of testing.
1 Introduction
Traditionally in the area of security, defenses are tested by
evaluating their resilience against relevant attacks. This is,
however, not the case for Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) pro-
tocols introduced in the seminal work of Lamport et al. [20]:
(i) Byzantine behavior is unconstrained, hence, one can only
implement a subset of such behaviors; and (ii) the subset of
Byzantine behaviors to be tested are chosen by system de-
velopers, who are naturally tainted by having designed the
system with certain limited Byzantine behaviors in mind. Sim-
ilar challenges arise when testing BFT protocols via formal
specification and verification methods. Here, too, branching
over Byzantine (arbitrary) behavior is unconstrained, lead-
ing to state explosion when modeling and model checking.
Last, as a pragmatical consideration, developing test code that
implements Byzantine attacks might be risky.
We propose Twins, a new approach for systematically test-
ing BFT systems. Instead of coding incorrect behavior, Twins
runs faulty nodes in two (or generally, k) parallel universes
in tandem. Both instances have the same credentials/signing-
keys and run autonomously. Thus, for example, both nodes
can send messages in the same protocol round, but these
messages will carry conflicting information; to the rest of the
system, this twins behavior will appear indistinguishable from
an equivocating behavior by a single node. In another exam-
ple, a node may ‘vote’ for something and its twin will ‘forget’
and contradict the vote; again, to the rest of the system, this
will appear indistinguishable from a single node behaving in
a ‘questionable’ manner.
Twins is based on the insight that most interesting Byzan-
tine attacks can rely on a correct implementation of the proto-
col, such that a Byzantine node appears to be honest. There-
fore, a message not generated by the correct implementation
will not be generated. This eliminates trivial issues such as
semantically invalid messages as well as more complex sce-
narios, e.g., sending a message without justification. Thus,
leveraging existing code, Twins can automatically cover most
material Byzantine behaviors.
Indeed, in Section 3, we demonstrate that several famous
attacks on BFT protocols are reinstated in the Twins approach.
Furthermore, in all cases, protocols break within fewer than
a dozen protocol steps, hence it is realistic for the Twin ap-
proach to expose the problem. In two of these attacks, it took
the community more than a decade to discover protocol flaws
that Twins would have surfaced within minutes. Addition-
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ally, we have built Twins testing into a production setting in
which Twins exposed (self-injected) subtle safety bugs within
minutes of testing.
We refer to Twins as a “white glove” approach: It is neither
“block-box”, since it does modify the internal behavior of the
tested system, nor is it “white-box”, because it does not open
internal code modules. Twins minutely interacts with existing
code to control message delivery and schedule various coarse-
steps such as protocol rounds. Most importantly, Twins is
practical to deploy in real systems as it uses existing correct
node code. Twins can be implemented by thinly wrapping
twin nodes with a network-scheduler acting as an adversary,
easily keeping up with an evolving software project.
Twins testing for BFT replication. Our work on Twins
arises in the context of BFT replication protocols. In this
domain, several worrisome safety and liveness vulnerabilities
were exposed recently [1,24] in both known protocols [18,23]
and in new ones [2].
One reason that BFT replication is particularly suitable for
Twin testing is the follows. A common paradigm underlying
practical BFT replication protocols is a view-by-view design.
Each view is driven by a designated leader proposing to the
nodes and going through voting rounds by the nodes. If a
leader is successful, a consensus decision is reached in the
view. If not, nodes give up after a timeout and move to the next
view. Transitioning to the new view/leader is tricky: A new
leader must discover if the previous leader was successful, but
it may be able to communicate only with a subset of the nodes.
The transition logic turns out to be the source of problems in
all the above cases, hence exposing the flaw requires only one
or two leader rotations.
Twins implementation. We built a unit-testing apparatus
based on the Twins approach in the LibraBFT open-source
project, the BFT replication core of the Libra payment sys-
tem [21]. To gain trust in safety-critical blockchains, proto-
cols like LibraBFT require much scrutiny.
Implementing Twin in LibraBFT consists of two principal
parts. The first is a test executor that deploys a network config-
uration where some nodes have twins. The test executor hides
twins behind a thin multiplexing wrapper; to the rest of the
system, each pair of twins appear as a single entity. The test
executor controls the scheduling of message deliveries accord-
ing to a prescribed scenario. This is accomplished through a
transport emulator in the LibraBFT repository called Network
Playground.
The second part is a test generator. The test generator
enumerates scenarios by varying the number of nodes and
the message delivery schedule, then feeding the scenarios to
the test executor. We describe in the paper several strategies
for drastically reducing the number of scenarios through ag-
gressive trimming of symmetrical scenarios. Among these
strategies, one minimally ‘opens’ the LibraBFT implementa-
tion and lets the test executor determine when a node acts as
a leader in the consensus protocol. This removes duplicate
scenarios that differ only in their leaders.
Section 7 reports on our experience with the Twins tester
in LibraBFT.
Coverage. What attacks does the Twins approach capture?
Developing a rigorous theory that answers this question is an
intriguing question left for future work. Indeed, test coverage
has not seen much study even in the relatively more scruti-
nized area of crash faults [26]. Here, we provide anecdotal
evidence of coverage in three forms:
(i) We bring intuition and experience of several decades of
work in the field. There are only a handful of ways in which
a Byzantine attacker can materially deviate from the safety
rules imposed by its protocol. For example, it can equivocate
and send different proposals to different groups of recipients,
or it can pretend it did not send/receive a message and propose
or vote in a manner that conflicts with such a message. In
Section 2, we provide insight on high-level attack behaviors
that Twins emulates.
(ii) Our real-life implementation provides compelling evi-
dence of coverage. In our evaluation in Section 7, we created a
simple safety-violating setting by deploying f +1 (instead of
f ) validators with Twins. This led to a consistency violation.
We further injected three subtle incorrect logic into LibraBFT,
which only slightly deviated from the original spec (similar
to mutation testing, a well-known technique to evaluate the
effectiveness of existing tests). In all three cases, with only f
twins (faults), Twins successfully exposed safety violations.
(iii) We demonstrate in Section 3 that several known at-
tacks on BFT consensus protocols are reinstated by the Twins
approach. These attacks cover a broad spectrum of vulnera-
bilities, e.g., safety, liveness, timing, and responsiveness.
Limitations & Scope. We recognize that (setting aside trivial,
easily filtered formatting violations) some Byzantine behav-
iors are not covered by Twins.
For one, in some protocol steps, a node may wait for mes-
sages to determine its next action. Under Twins, the node
is forced to act according to the messages it received, as if
the node provided a justification for each step in form of the
history of messages it received. Deviating from this behavior
was not required to reinstate any of the attacks discussed in
Section 3, though in principle, various deviating behaviors
would not be covered by Twins. Another coverage challenge
emerges in synchronous protocols because a node behavior
may be based on real time. In such protocols, Twins essen-
tially forces a node to behave in a timely manner. We tackle
this case in one of the attacks investigated in Section 3 and
demonstrate that nonetheless, a slight adaptation of the origi-
nal attack reinstates the attack in Twins. However, we do not
know yet which timing attacks may not be covered.
Additional challenges stem from pragmatic needs. In par-
ticular, while the Twins approach allows creating up to k
instances of a node, throughout this paper we set k = 2. The
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Byzantine behavior emulated by Twins involves equivocation
or duplication, which needs only two messages to diverge or
match. This choice helps us cover interesting cases, while
pruning potentially redundant testcases due to higher values
of k. It is unknown yet which safety violations can only be
covered by k > 2.
Finally, this paper explores the use of Twins to expose
safety and liveness violations—the principal properties of
BFT systems. There are other properties of BFT systems such
as transaction inclusion and fairness [7, 17] and performance
bounds [5], that Twins testing can be extended to verify.
Increasing coverage of Twins in the settings we explore as
well as others, and providing a formal treatment of coverage
remain interesting open challenges; we discuss some concrete
future directions in Section 9.
2 Motivating the Twins Approach
We open this section with a quick primer on the Byzantine
Fault Tolerant (BFT) replication problem, and describe the
notation that will be used to describe attacks through the
rest of this paper. We then provide high-level intuition on
why Twins is a viable approach by showing the different
kinds of Byzantine behaviors that can be captured by Twins.
(Concrete attacks using Twins are described later in Section 3
and Section 7.1.)
BFT Replication. The goal of BFT replication is for a group
of nodes to provide a fault-tolerant service through redun-
dancy. Clients submit requests to the service. These requests
are collectively sequenced by the nodes; this enables all nodes
to execute the same chain of requests and hence agree on their
(deterministic) output.
Except when specifically noted, we consider protocols that
maintain safety against arbitrary delays in message transmis-
sions. That is, we assume an asynchronous network setting.
The main challenge is to drive agreement on a chain of re-
quests (and their output) among all non-faulty nodes despite
node failures. It is common to rely on leaders to populate the
network with a unique proposal. During periods in which the
leader is non-faulty and communication among the leader and
non-faulty nodes is timely, this regime can drive consensus
quickly. This approach is called partial synchrony, indicating
that it maintains safety at all times and progress only during
periods of synchrony.
In the Byzantine fault model, a node may crash or arbitrar-
ily deviate from the protocol. In this setting, a BFT replica-
tion system implements a fault tolerant service via n nodes, of
which a threshold f < n/3 may be Byzantine. As Byzantine
behavior is defined rather vaguely, there is no principled way
to evaluate BFT systems. Twins is a new approach to system-
atically test the safety and liveness of BFT systems. The main
idea of Twins is the following: running two (generally, up to
k) autonomous instances of a node that both use correct code
and share the same identity, allows us to emulate most inter-
esting Byzantine attacks. Two nodes share the same identity
when they share the same credentials and signing keys.
Notation. Nodes are represented by capital alphabets (e.g.,
A) and the twin of a node is represented by the same alphabet
with the prime symbol (e.g., A′). When referring to a set of
nodes, we enclose them in parentheses e.g., (A,B,B′). We
underline a node that is serving as the leader, e.g., A. The
adversary can delay and filter messages between nodes. We
denote partitions of nodes by enclosing them in braces, e.g.,
P1 = {A,B,C,D} and P2 = {E,F,G}, and reserve the capital
letter P to denote them. Additionally, to show messages
allowed in a given direction, we use the symbols → and
↔. For example, A→ (B,C) means A can send messages
to B and C; similarly, A↔ P2 means A can send messages
to and receive messages from any node of the partition P2.
The scenarios described below use a network configuration
of 7 nodes, (A,B,C,D,E,F,G). Byzantine nodes have twins
denoted with ′, as in F ′, G′. To experiment with any of the
deviating behaviors described below, one can increase the
number of Byzantine faults to f +1 (say E,F,G have twins
E ′,F ′,G′) and expect to see conflicting commits.
Equivocation. A quintessential Byzantine behavior is for a
node to equivocate. That is, in the same step, a Byzantine
node might send different messages to different recipients.
Twins covers equivocation by splitting honest nodes be-
tween two partitions, each one communicating with only one
twin of each pair. For example, we can split the system into
P1 = {A,B,C,D,F},P2 = {C,D,E,F ′,G}. The leader(s) F
and F ′ execute correct leader code but nevertheless may gener-
ate conflicting proposals due to different inputs or randomness
seeds. If there is a protocol flaw then these conflicting pro-
posals could respectively commit in P1 and P2, hence safety
breaks.
Amnesia. An important role that nodes have in agreement
protocols is vote for a single proposal per view. However, a
Byzantine node might vote for a proposal and then ‘forget’
that it has voted and vote again. Twins covers amnesia by
letting one of the twins vote on one proposal. Since the other
twin is oblivious to the vote happening, it may nevertheless—
albeit executing correct code—vote on a different proposal.
More concretely, as in the scenario above, we can split
the nodes into two partitions, P1 = {A,B,E,F,G},P2 =
{C,D,E,F ′,G′}. If there is a protocol flaw then this double-
voting behavior may result in conflicting commits in P1 and
P2, hence safety breaks.
Losing internal states. Another notable deviation for Byzan-
tine nodes is to lose their internal state, particularly a lock that
guards a value they voted for. Twins covers this deviation by
letting one of the twins get locked on a value in one view, but
in some subsequent view, bring the other twin who is ignorant
that a lock exists.
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More concretely, we can split the nodes into two partitions
P1 = {A,B,E,F,G},P2 = {C,D,E,F ′,G′}. In one view, the
adversary relays messages only among P1. In the next view,
it switches to P2, causing F ′,G′—albeit executing correct
code—to ignore their ‘previous’ actions. This can repeat any
number of times. If there is a protocol flaw then conflicting
proposals may commit in different views, hence safety breaks.
3 Known Attacks
In this section, we demonstrate several attacks on BFT replica-
tion protocols with known vulnerabilities, expressed as Twins
scenarios. We provide insight into the attacks and defer the
details of all but the linear leader-replacement attack to an
appendix, due to space constraints.
3.1 Reinstated Attacks
We present several known attacks on BFT protocols, ex-
pressed as Twins scenarios. In all cases, exposing vulner-
abilities requires only a small number of nodes, partitions,
rounds and leader rotations. It is worth noting that later, our
evaluation (Section 7) of LibTwins, Twins implemented for
LibraBFT, shows that running an automated scenario gener-
ator (Section 4.2) with these configurations would cover the
described attacks within minutes1.
Safety attack on Zyzzyva. Zyzzyva broke new ground in
BFT replication with the introduction of an optimistic single
phase “fast track” commit. Eleven years elapsed from its
publication until a safety flaw in Zyzzyva was discovered [1],
during which numerous research project and systems were
built on it. Twins generates a scenario that exposes the flaw
with 4 nodes and two leader rotations: the first leader equiv-
ocates via a twin, and the next two leaders drop messages
to/from some nodes. The details of this attack using Twins is
described in Appendix B.
Liveness attack on FaB. FaB [23], a precursor to Zyzzyva,
is a view-based protocol with an optimistic fast track. Not
surprisingly, a similar problem arises in FaB due to a flawed
leader replacement protocol [1], albeit manifesting as a live-
ness bug. Twins exposes this bug in a short scenario with
n = 4 and three leader rotations, leading to a complete ab-
sence of leader proposals. The detailed attack using Twins is
described in Appendix C.
Timing attack on Sync HotStuff. Force-Locking Attack [24]
is a timing attack on a preliminary version of a synchronous
BFT protocol named Sync HotStuff [2] (which was subse-
quently updated to resist the attack). As before, Twins cap-
tures this attack with only a small system size, n = 5, and
1We did not undertake to re-implement all these protocols and apply a
Twins test generator to them; our implementation covers only LibraBFT [21]
two leader rotations. However, in order to create timing at-
tacks, Twins needs to be aware of timing information for
protocol steps and messages deliveries. Extending Twins
with timing data is left for future work. In the specific attack
at hand, course-grain timing at fixed intervals—fewer than
ten—suffice to reinstate the attack. The detailed attack using
Twins is described in Appendix D.
Non-Responsiveness attack on linear leader-replacement.
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [11] is a semi-
nal work that was designed to work efficiently in the asyn-
chronous setting. Carrying the classical PBFT solution to the
blockchain world, Tendermint [9] and Capser [10] introduced
a simplified linear strategy for leader-replacement. However,
it has been observed [8,32] that this strategy forgoes an impor-
tant property of asynchronous protocols—Responsiveness—
the ability of a leader to advance as soon as it receives mes-
sages from 2 f + 1 nodes2. Indeed, bringing linear leader-
replacement approach into PBFT, we demonstrate a liveness
attack using a Twins scenario. Lack of progress is detected
by observing that two consecutive views with honest leaders
whose communication with a quorum is timely do not pro-
duce a decision. We present the details of this attack using
Twins in the next section.
3.2 Non-Responsiveness Attack
We now describe in more detail the non-Responsiveness at-
tack above on linear leader-replacement. The seminal PBFT
solution operates two-phase views. A simplified, linear leader-
replacement works as follows. A leader proposes to extend the
highest quorum certificate (QC) it knows. A QC is formed on
a proposed value if it gathers 2 f +1 votes from nodes. Nodes
vote on the leader proposal if it extends the highest QC they
know. A commit decision on the leader proposal forms if
2 f +1 nodes form a QC, and then 2 f +1 nodes vote for the
QC. Progress is hinged on leaders obtaining the highest QC
from the system, otherwise liveness is broken.
Using the notation from Section 2, the liveness attack here
uses 4 replicas (D,E,F,G), where D has a twin D′. In the
first view, D and D′ generate equivocating proposals. Only
D,E receive a QC for D’s proposal. The next leader is F
who proposes to re-propose the proposal by D′, which E
and D do not vote for because they already have a QC for
that height. Only F and D′ receive a QC for F’s proposal.
This scenario repeats indefinitely, resulting in loss of liveness.
More specifically, this attack works as follows:
View 1: Initialize D and D′ with different inputs v1 and v2.
• Create the partitions P1 = {D,E,G}, P2 = {D′,F}.
2Tendermint is a precursor to HotStuff [33] and LibraBFT [21] which
operates in two-phase views, but has no Responsiveness. HotStuff/LibraBFT
solve this by adding a third phase.
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Figure 1: Twins high-level design.
• Let D and D′ run as leaders for one round. D proposes
v1 to P1 and gathers votes from P1 creating QC(v1). D′
proposes v2 to P2 and gathers votes but not a QC.
• Create the following partitions: P1 = {D,E}, P2 =
{D′,F}, P3 = {G}. D broadcasts QC(v1), which only
reaches P1 i.e., (D,E).
View 2: Drop all proposals from D and D′ until View 2 starts.
• Remove all partitions, i.e., P = {D,D′,E,F ,G}.
• Let F run as leader for one round. F re-proposes v2 (i.e.,
D′’s proposal in the previous round) to P. (D,E) do
not vote as they already have QC(v1) for that height. F
gathers votes from the other nodes and forms QC(v2).
• Create partitions P1 = {D,E}, P2 = {D′,F}, P3 = {G}.
• F broadcasts QC(v2), which only reaches P2.
View 3: Drop all proposals from F until View 3 starts.
• Create the partitions P1 = {D,E,G}, P2 = {D′,F}.
• Let E run as leader for one round. E proposes v3 which
extends the highest QC it knows, QC(v1). As before, E
manages to form QC(v3), but as a result of a partition,
the QC will only reach (D,E). Next, there is a view-
change, F is the new leader, and there are no partitions.
F proposes v4 which extends QC(v2), the highest QC it
knows. However, (D,E) do not vote because v4 does not
extend their highest QC i.e., QC(v3). This scenario can
repeat indefinitely, resulting in the loss of liveness.
4 Systematic Unit-Test Generation
Whereas the previous section demonstrated manually crafted
Twins attack scenarios, this section presents a strategy for
systematically generating Twins scenarios.
Systematically and efficiently generating unit-test scenarios
that provide good coverage requires tailoring to the specific
BFT protocol settings. The Twins tester generates and ex-
ecutes scenarios, or testcases, which describe the node and
network configurations. Specifically, the Twins tester is com-
prised of two components as shown in Figure 1: (i) the test
executor, and (ii) the test generator. The test executor runs
a single testcase and generates output logs, while the test
generator produces various testcases that are fed to the test
executor to check for violations. The following design goals
underlie the Twins tester:
• Generic & Modular. Twins is modular with respect
to the particular BFT protocol implementation being
tested, impose as little complexity as possible on the
development, and easily keep up with code changes.
• Parametrizable. The test network setup (i.e., the num-
ber of nodes, leaders per round, and network configura-
tion per round) and adversarial assumptions (i.e., how
many Byzantine faults are tolerated) is configurable.
• Feasible. Twins allows pruning duplicate scenarios in
order to provide coverage of material attacks.
• Customizable Coverage. The coverage of testcases, i.e.,
the subset of all possible testcases to choose for test
execution, is configurable by randomly sampling tests to
run among all possible enumeration.
• Reproducible. Twins writes logs to persistent storage,
containing sufficient information to detect and reproduce
any safety violations.
Next, we describe the two main components (Figure 1) of
Twins—the test executor and the test generator—in detail.
4.1 Test Executor
In every Twins test, a threshold of the nodes are ‘misconfig-
ured’ to have a twin instance with identical transport endpoint
credential and secret keys. The Twins test executor gets as
input a testcase consisting of a node-set, a subset of which are
marked compromised (representing Byzantine nodes); and
a round-by-round message delivery schedule. The test ex-
ecutor sets up a network of nodes with a given number of
compromised nodes and per round partitions and leaders. The
compromised nodes correspond to the nodes for which the test
executor creates twins (i.e., identical instances with the same
credentials and signing keys), thereby emulating misbehavior.
As mentioned above, we address BFT replication protocols
that proceed in rounds initiated by a designated leader, each
round representing a state transition in the protocol’s state
machine replicated on each node. For each round, the test
executor creates a given network partition and assigns given
leaders to the round. The test executor runs the BFT protocol
among nodes for a pre-specified number of rounds, at the end
of which, the test executor checks for violations. Specifically,
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protocol guarantees can be violated in two principal ways,
safety and liveness. A safety violation is detected if two
nodes commit to conflicting decisions. A liveness violation
can be detected if the protocol fails to commit within a certain
number of steps or a certain duration bound.
4.2 Test Generator
We build a test generator of round-by-round scenarios: for
each round, the test generator enumerates possible leaders and
message delivery schedules among nodes. The test generator
produces various testcases to be fed into the test executor.
Each testcase represents a unique instance of executor con-
figuration parameters, i.e., the compromised nodes and per
round network partitions and leaders. Testcases are generated
systematically as follows (see notations in Section 2):
• Step 1. The test generator first produces the set of all pos-
sible partitions of nodes (called partition scenarios). For
example, for a network of 4 nodes (A,B,C,D), possible
partition scenarios (P) include {P1 = {A,D},{B,C}},
and P2 = {{A},{B,C,D}}. This problem relates to the
Stirling Number of the Second Kind [28] which enumer-
ates the ways in which a set of N nodes can be divided
up into P non-empty partitions, where P ranges from N
(i.e., each node is self-isolated) to 1 (i.e., fully connected
network without partitions).
• Step 2. Next the test generator assigns each partition
scenario to all possible leaders i.e., the set of N nodes
assuming any of those can be a potential leader. For
example, for the example partition scenario above {P1 =
{A,D},{B,C}} for a network of nodes (A,B,C,D),
possible leader-partition combinations include {A,P1},
{B,P1}, {C,P1}, {D,P1}. Each leader-partition combi-
nation fully describes the Twins configuration required
for each round.
• Step 3. The test generator lists testcases by enumerat-
ing all possible ways in which the leader-partition pairs
generated in the previous step can be arranged over R
rounds (i.e., permutation, with or without replacement).
The test generator iterates over the generated testcases lin-
early, and invokes the test executor for each testcase. For
safety tests, usually a small number of rounds (< 10) suffices
to expose logical bugs in the protocol. Test generators there-
fore need to enumerate a reasonable number of combinations.
Pruning testcases. Important to the success of the approach
is for the test generator to avoid duplicate testcases (e.g., in
symmetry or node label3 rotation) and generate only mate-
3Nodes can have designated roles in the protocol, referred to as node
labels. Twins incorporates the label ‘leader’, which is the case for standard
BFT protocols. Extensions of these protocols might have further hierarchy
e.g., primary and secondary leaders. This is currently not supported, but the
test generator can be easily extended to support different node labels.
rially different scenarios. The implementation we describe
in the Evaluation section of this paper (Section 7) employs
aggressively such pruning. Certain heuristics further sub-
stantially reduce the number of scenario configurations. For
example, in most safety violations the set of honest parties
is split into two, hence it suffices to play with two or three
partitions per round. These optimizations make it feasible
to cover a broad range of meaningful testcases. For liveness
tests, many testcases will obviously fail to make progress
because there does not exist a super-majority quorum that
has reliable and timely communication among its members.
Hence, for liveness testing the test generator must guarantee
that eventually such a quorum exists.
Message delays and timeouts. We note that the test gen-
erator does not address message delays and timeouts, only
the dropping of messages and their relative delivery order.
Because the BFT protocol may employ timers, the dropping
of messages implicitly implies that relevant endpoint incur a
violation of presumed bounds on transmission delays. Future
work may incorporate explicit message delays into the test
generator to test for specific timing violations and also to test
BFT protocols in the synchronous model (Section 9).
5 Overview of LibraBFT
We now shift our attention to utilizing Twins for testing BFT
replication in LibraBFT [21]. We discuss our implementation
and evaluation of Twins for LibraBFT in Sections 6 and 7. In
this section, we provide an overview of LibraBFT (for details,
see the technical report [29]).
LibraBFT operates in a round-by-round manner, electing
leaders in each round among the nodes to balance node par-
ticipation. Rounds are slightly different from conventional
“views” because it takes multiple rounds to reach a decision,
but leaders are rotated in each round. The leader protocol is
quite simple. A leader proposes an extension to the longest
chain of requests that it knows already. Usually leaders collect
batches of requests to propose, referred to as blocks, hence the
LibraBFT protocol forms a chain of blocks (or a blockchain).
Nodes vote for a proposed block, unless it conflicts with a
longer chain that they believe may have reached consensus
already. Nodes send their votes to the next leader to help the
leader learn the longest safe chain. If there are three consecu-
tive blocks in the chain, Bk, Bk+1, Bk+2, which are proposed
in consecutive rounds, rk, rk+1, rk+2, and each block has
votes from 2 f +1 nodes (gathered in a data structure called
the quorum certificate, or QC), then the protocol has reached
consensus on block Bk.
If 2 f +1 send votes to the next leader in a timely manner,
a QC is formed by the leader and it sends the next proposal.
Nodes maintain a timer to track progress. When the timer
expires and a node still has not received a proposal, it broad-
casts a timeout vote on a Nil block. When a node gathers
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enough timeout votes to form a timeout certificate, it advances
its round. Every time a round fails, timeout periods are in-
creased, allowing lagging nodes to catch up and enabling the
protocol to eventually reach a decision.
As briefly alluded to in the Introduction, the trickiest part
of BFT replication is to manage leader transition. LibraBFT
maintains four parameters to ensure safety, and at the same
time facilitate progress: (i) current_round, the node’s cur-
rent round; (ii) last_voted_round, the last round for which
the node voted; (iii) parent_round, the round of the block
certified by the QC attached with the block being processed;
(iv) grand parent_round, the parent of the block certified by
the QC; and (iv) pre f erred_round, the highest known grand-
parent round. Note that as a QC serves as a pointer to the pre-
vious certified block, parent_round and grand parent_round
do not need to be explicitly tracked; these can be derived from
the QC carried by a block.
Upon Receiving a Proposal. Upon receiving proposal for
a block, a node processes the certificates it carries, and votes
for the proposed block if it satisfies a simple voting rule: If
a node voted for Bk+2, it prefers the sub-tree of proposals
rooted at block Bk (regardless of round numbers). A node
will not vote for a block B that does not belong to its preferred
sub-tree rooted at Bk, unless B’s parent has votes from 2 f +1
nodes at a higher round than rk. Concretely:
• Safety Rule 1. The block_round is greater than
last_voted_round.
• Safety Rule 2. The block’s parent_round is greater than
or equal to pre f erred_round.
If the node decides to vote for the proposed block, it updates
its state as follows:
• Update Rule 1. Update last_voted_round to round of
the proposed block.
• Update Rule 2. Update the node’s pre f erred_round to
the proposed block’s grand parent_round if the latter is
higher.
• Update Rule 3. Update the node’s current_round to the
parent_round, if the latter is higher.
Upon Receiving a Vote. For every round, the nodes send
their votes to the leader of the next round. When the leader
receives a vote, it performs the following safety checks:
• Safety Rule 3. If a vote from the same node was previ-
ously received for the same block and round, the leader
rejects the vote and generates a ‘duplicate vote’ warning.
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Figure 2: Consensus and preferred sub-trees in LibraBFT.
• Safety Rule 4. If a vote from the same node was previ-
ously received for a different block but same round, the
leader rejects the vote and generates an ‘equivocating
vote’ warning.
If a vote passes both these checks, the leader considers it as
valid and checks if it has enough votes to form a QC. When a
QC has been formed, the leader generates a new round event,
broadcasts a new block proposal and updates its state.
• Update rule 4. When a leader gathers enough votes to
form a QC, it broadcasts a new proposal and increments
current_round.
Spoiler alert: In our evaluation in Section 7.1, we are going
to deliberately modify the above rules. We will see that this
enables safety violations that the Twins tester will expose.
6 Implementation
We implemented a Twins tester for LibraBFT, which we call
LibTwins. As described in Section 4, an implementation
consists of two principal ingredients, a test generator and
an test executor (Figure 1). We first describe the test execu-
tor implementation which leverages a network emulator in
LibraBFT referred to as the network playground. We then
proceed to describe the test generator implementation. For
completeness, the Rust code and interfaces for the main func-
tions of LibTwins, execute_test and test_generator, are
provided in Appendix A. We are open sourcing the Rust im-
plementation of LibTwins4.
6.1 Test Executor
The LibTwins test executor leverages the test framework of
LibraBFT, network playground5. Network playground pro-
vides an apparatus for unit tests and for running single-host
LibraBFT deployments, emulating a network and intercept-
ing all messages exchanged between nodes. Tests can be
4 https://github.com/libra/libra
5https://github.com/libra/libra/blob/master/consensus/
src/chained_bft/network_tests.rs
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Figure 3: Design of Libra’s Network Playground for writing unit tests for LibraBFT protocol.
written to manipulate the intercepted messages (e.g., by drop-
ping certain messages) and observe node response. Figure 3
shows the design of the network playground. Nodes are rep-
resented by processes run on different threads (that run the
full consensus protocol), and network links between them
are expressed as Rust channels that provide asynchronous
unidirectional communication between threads. In LibraBFT,
nodes are identified by their Account Address (a public key
that uniquely identifies a node). Channels are associated with
their respective account addresses (nodes). When a node starts
a new round, it checks whether it is leader for this round; if
yes, then it generates on the fly a block to propose using a
mock block generator. Each call to the mock block generator
produces a different block. This has important implication
for LibTwins, as we require a node and its twin to propose
different blocks at the same round to emulate equivocation.
The test executor component (Section 4) of LibTwins is
built on top of network playground. This required the follow-
ing modifications and extensions to the original library:
• Adding twins. We wrote a new method to add nodes to
the network that supports twins. The method takes ‘com-
promised nodes’ as a parameter to refer to the nodes for
which to create twins. For each target node, a duplicate
instance is created with the same credentials and signing
keys. Consequently, in the eyes of the other nodes the
compromised node and its twin are indistinguishable.
• Inferring rounds. LibTwins requires to apply a num-
ber of filtering policies at the round level. Network
playground does not have a notion of rounds—it only
supports static configurations that remain unchanged
throughout protocol execution. There is no global notion
of rounds in a distributed system with partial synchrony;
instead, nodes have their own view of which round they
are in, which they include in their messages. We enable
network playground to extract round from intercepted
messages and accordingly apply filtering criteria.
• Round-based message filtering. Network playground
allows writing rules to drop intercepted messages that
meet certain criteria, i.e., messages to or from specified
nodes and messages of specified types e.g., votes or pro-
posals. LibTwins extends network playground to drop
intercepted messages per round, which allows emulat-
ing different network partitions per round. The message
dropping rules treat compromised nodes and their twins
differently—the rules apply to account addresses (which
uniquely identify nodes), not public keys (which are the
same for a target node and its twins).
• Deterministic multi-leader election. LibraBFT cur-
rently uses a non-deterministic leader election algorithm.
LibTwins requires leader election at a finer granularity,
i.e., assigning a specified leader to each round, poten-
tially assigning multiple leaders to a round (because if a
compromised node is elected as a round leader, its twins
becomes leader too). We wrote a new leader election al-
gorithm for LibraBFT that supports these requirements.
To emulate running the protocol for a given number of
rounds, we approximate rounds by the number of messages
emitted by nodes. Note that in a system with partial synchrony,
we can only make guesses about rounds as there is no global
notion of rounds. Using message-count per-round (without
partitions) as an ‘over-guesstimate’, we let the nodes vote
for 3 extra rounds. Over-running a test has no consequence
on the results of LibTwins (other than longer test execution
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time) because any safety violations would have already been
detected in earlier rounds.
6.2 Test Generator
The test generator produces testcases in three main steps.
First, it generates all the possible ways in which a set of
N nodes can be split into P partitions (partition scenarios).
Second, it generates all possible ways in which L leaders can
be combined with the partitions generated in the previous
step. Finally, it generates all the possible ways in which
the partition-leader combinations can be permuted over R
rounds of consensus protocol execution. The test generator
can operate in online or offline modes. In the online mode,
testcases are generated on the fly, and fed to the test executor.
The test generator can be configured to write the generated
testcases to a file. In the offline mode, the test generator
reads previously generated testcases from a file and feeds
them to the test executor. For debugging purposes, the test
generator can also operate in a ‘dry run’ mode—testcases are
generated with the given parameters, without running them,
and statistics are printed at the end.
A naïve enumeration of all combinations of P partitions,
L leaders, and R rounds may explode quickly (see Table 1).
In order to constrain the number of generated testcases in
a particular run, we provide hooks to control the number
of P partitions, the number of L leader-partition pairs, and
the number of leader-partition configuration assignments to
rounds. For all three cases, we specify whether the selection
is deterministic—first X—or randomized—an X sample. In
the third case—configuration assignment to rounds—the total
combination space to select from is large. Therefore, the
test generator allows randomizing the per-round configura-
tion selection, rather than sampling over the entire space of
assignments.
7 Evaluation
We validate the capability of LibTwins to model and detect
attacks, present microbenchmarks for the main components
of LibTwins, and describe our experiments at scale using
Amazon Web Services (AWS) [4]. We are open sourcing
the Rust implementation of LibTwins, AWS orchestration
scripts, and microbenchmarking scripts and data to enable
reproducible results6.
All our evaluations correspond to 4–7 nodes, 4–7 rounds
and 2–3 partitions. Intuitively, these configurations seem suf-
ficient to expose any safety violations. Indeed, the known
attacks on BFT protocols described in Section 3 were exposed
with only a small number of nodes, partitions and leader rota-
tions. A recent work [26] on the coverage of random testing
to detect crash faults shows that coverage depends on the
6 https://github.com/libra/libra
number of partitions and node labels (in our case, the lead-
ers), but not on the number of nodes. For Jepsen [16], all the
bugs that provide meaningful coverage have a small number
of rounds, and 2–3 partitions and roles [26]. Using higher
values for these parameters leads to a very large number of
testcases, which cannot be feasibly tested without some sort
of filtering (Section 6.2). It is an interesting open question
whether increasing the value of these parameters has a higher
chance of exposing safety violations.
7.1 Validation
We deliberately introduce bugs to LibraBFT, and validate that
LibTwins is able to model and detect attacks that exploit the
injected vulnerabilities. This approach is similar to mutation
testing, a well-known technique to evaluate the quality of
existing tests in terms of whether they can detect programs
with deliberately injected modifications (called “mutants”).
While approaches such as automated mutation testing can help
us to exhaustively introduce mutants, this is computationally
expensive and not practical for large, complex systems. We
select bugs to inject into LibraBFT based on their ability to
compromise the program’s functional correctness. We note
that this choice is based on our intuition and experience, and
does not provide any coverage guarantees. The validation
approach we use is to: (i) inject the bug into LibraBFT; and (ii)
generate testcases using the LibTwins test generator, checking
for any safety violations. We instantiate the test generator
with different configurations, starting with small parameter
values that we increase until a safety violation is exposed.
We begin with the base case: can LibTwins generate a test-
case that violates safety when the BFT threshold is exceeded
(i.e., > f Byzantine nodes)? We discovered a safety viola-
tion with 4 nodes and 2 twins (A,B,C,D,A′,B′), 7 rounds,
and static scenario configuration (i.e., each partition-leader
combination is run for all R rounds). LibTwins executed 62
testcases of which 8 led to safety violation within 86s.
Changing quorum size to 2 f . BFT protocols consider a
state transition safe if it receives votes from an honest majority
of nodes (i.e., quorum). We change LibraBFT’s quorum size
from 2 f +1 to 2 f . LibTwins detects a safety violation with 4
nodes and 1 twin (A,B,C,D,A′), 7 rounds, and static scenario
configuration (i.e., where each partition-leader combination
is run for all the R rounds). Within 20s, LibTwins executes 14
testcases of which 6 lead to safety violation. These testcases
have the same pattern: Nodes are split into two partitions of
size 2 and 3, with A in one partition and A′ in the other. As
nodes in the two partitions can form quorum, oblivious to each
other they continue to generate quorum certificates on blocks
proposed by A and A′, respectively. Ultimately, nodes in the
two partitions commit two different blocks. In the log excerpt
below from one of the test executions, honest nodes (A,B,C)
commit block 9be3486 f extending parent block 4ce7be08,
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while another honest node D extends the same parent but
committing a different block a9 f f 86ce.
[A] Commit [id: 9be3486f, round: 1, parent_id: 4ce7be08]
[B] Commit [id: 9be3486f, round: 1, parent_id: 4ce7be08]
[C] Commit [id: 9be3486f, round: 1, parent_id: 4ce7be08]
[D] Commit [id: a9ff86ce, round: 1, parent_id: 4ce7be08]
[A’] Commit [id: a9ff86ce, round: 1, parent_id: 4ce7be08]
Accepting conflicting votes. When a node receives a block
proposal, it votes for the block only if the block_round is
greater than the last_voted_round (Safety Rule 1, Section 5).
We introduce a subtle bug to LibraBFT by changing this rule,
so that a node votes for a block if the block_round is greater
than or equal to the last_voted_round. LibTwins detects the
safety violation within a few seconds, with 4 nodes and 1 twin
{A,B,C,D,A′}, and 7 rounds. This safety bug was detected
in one-shot, with 0 partitions. Nodes vote on proposals from
both A and A′—after a few rounds, they end up committing
two different proposals for the same round.
Forgetting to update preferred round. When a node
receives a block proposal, it votes for the block if
the block_round is greater than last_voted_round, and
the block’s parent_round is greater than or equal to
pre f erred_round (Safety rules 1 and 2, Section 5). We dis-
able the first check, and bypass the second check by never
updating pre f erred_round so it permanently remains at 0
(Update rule 2, Section 5). The main ingredient of an attack
that exploits the bug described above is to propose a block
in an old round, and get the nodes to over-write committed
blocks (safety violation). The challenge for LibTwins is that
as a twin node runs correct code, it cannot be made to propose
blocks in arbitrary rounds. One option is to partition the twin
node in an old round, and bring it back up in a later round,
so it starts proposing blocks from where it left. This is, how-
ever, not possible in a ‘full disclosure’ protocol like LibraBFT
where each quorum certificate (or timeout certificate) contains
the full history of previous messages that led to the certificate.
That is, as soon as A′ recovers from the partition, it receives a
quorum certificate (or timeout certificate) from other nodes
and advances its round.
To emulate A′ going back in time and proposing a block for
an older round, we let it run as leader for a few rounds, crash
it, and then recover it again as leader. When A′ comes back up
again it starts from round 0, proposing a block that builds on
the genesis block (the first committed block). Because of our
modifications to the pre f erred_round and last_voted_round
checks, the nodes re-write history.
7.2 Microbenchmarks
We present microbenchmarks for the two main components
of LibTwins: test generator (Section 6.2) and test executor
(Section 6.1). The microbenchmarks are run on an Apple lap-
top (MacBook Pro) with a 2.9 GHz Intel Core i9 (6 physical
and 12 logical cores), and 32 GB 2400 MHz DDR4 RAM.
Test generator microbenchmarks. The test generator in-
curs a one-time computational cost—once the testcases are
generated, the test generator feeds them one by one to the test
executor. Table 1 shows the number of testcases generated
with different configurations. We observe that the number of
nodes and the number of rounds significantly increase the out-
put of Step 1, which increases proportionally in the number of
twins (as we only configure nodes with twins to become lead-
ers). We find that non-static configurations in Step 3 cause the
number of testcases to explode. Therefore, of the various fil-
ters implemented for the test generator (Section 6.2), we find
the filter at Step 2 to be most useful. We use this filter to make
our at-scale Twins testing (Section 7.3) feasible. Note that this
inevitably comes at the cost of completeness of coverage—a
trade-off that we cannot completely eliminate. Figure 4 shows
how long the test generator takes to produce testcases for the
same number of nodes (4) and partitions (2), and 4 (Figure 4a)
and 7 (Figure 4b) rounds. We observe that while it expectedly
takes longer to generate testcases for 7 rounds vs. 4 rounds
due to a larger number of permutations, for each case the time
taken increases linearly in the number of testcases. We ob-
serve a similar linear trend in our microbenchmarks for other
configurations with varying number of nodes and partitions
(figures not included due to space constraints).
Test executor microbenchmarks. Table 2 shows the time
the test executor takes to execute a testcase. We repeat each
measurement over 100 randomly selected testcases from a
configuration with 2 partitions, and varying number of nodes
(4 and 7) and rounds (4–12). We observe that for 4 nodes,
the execution time ranges from 234–465ms for 4–12 rounds,
with a maximum standard deviation of 314ms. For 7 nodes,
the execution time ranges from 547–748ms for 4–12 rounds,
with a maximum standard deviation of ∼ 1.2s.
The variation observed above in execution times is ex-
pected because of how LibraBFT handles timeouts (Section 5).
For each testcase, LibTwins runs LibraBFT until it has ob-
served a given number of messages (proposals and votes),
which roughly corresponds to the number of rounds. In some
testcases, LibTwins can quickly pull out the given number
of messages and finish the testcase in a timely manner. In
other testcases, we might end up with partitions where the
nodes are not able to make progress and advance rounds, due
to frequent round failures and increased timeout values. The
implication of this for LibTwins is that some testcases may
take longer to run, waiting for the network to emit enough
messages to conclude the test. The execution of testcases has
negligible (< 0.1%) memory and CPU footprints.
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Figure 4: Time taken by the test generator to produce LibTwins testcases. Each data point is the average of 10 runs; error bars represent one standard deviation.
Nodes Twins Partitions Rounds Step 1 Step 2 Step 3Without Replacement With Replacement Static
4 1 2 4 15 15 ∼ 3×104 ∼ 5×104 15
4 1 3 4 25 25 ∼ 3×105 ∼ 4×105 25
4 1 2 7 15 15 ∼ 3×107 ∼ 2×108 15
4 1 3 7 25 25 ∼ 2×109 ∼ 6×109 25
7 2 2 4 255 510 ∼ 7×1010 ∼ 7×1010 510
7 2 3 4 3,025 6,050 ∼ 1×1010 ∼ 1×1015 6,050
7 2 2 7 255 510 ∼ 9×1018 ∼ 9×1018 510
7 2 3 7 3,025 6,050 ∼ 3×1026 ∼ 3×1026 6,050
Table 1: The number of LibTwins testcases generated for various configurations. Steps 1,2 and 3 correspond to the testcase generation pipeline described in
Section 4. Step 1: The number of ways in which N nodes can be distributed among P partitions. Step 2: The number of ways in which the partitions generated
in Step 1 can be combined with leaders. Step 3: The number of ways in which the partition-leader pairs generated in Step 2 can be permuted (with and without
replacement) over R rounds. Static configuration refers to the case where each partition-leader pair is statically configured for all the R rounds.
Rounds 4 Nodes 7 NodesMean (ms) Std. (ms) Mean (ms) Std. (ms)
4 239 314 547 1,286
5 250 87 555 1,059
6 284 88 555 802
7 296 87 559 752
8 334 209 647 810
9 363 175 643 557
10 398 222 653 539
11 433 168 718 570
12 465 179 748 223
Table 2: The time test executor takes to execute a testcase for 4 and 7 nodes,
over varying number of rounds and fixed partitions (=2). Each measurement
is repeated for 100 randomly selected testcases.
7.3 Running Tests at Scale
We evaluate LibTwins at scale, by running it against the cor-
rect code of LibraBFT. Specifically, we executed 3M testcases
which were randomly selected from the 200M testcases cor-
responding to the third row of Table 1 (that is, with 4 nodes,
2 partitions, 7 rounds, permuted with replacement). We first
generated all the 200M testcases and randomly selected 3M
samples. We ran the test generator in offline mode so the
testcases are written to file rather than being passed to the
test executor. We then split the generated testcases into 20
shards. The testcases can be easily sharded, as the tests are
independent of each other—this implies that subject to the
availability of computing power to generate and execute test-
cases, LibTwins can be scaled up arbitrarily via sharding. We
execute the sharded testcases over 20 parallel instances of
LibTwins on AWS. We use t3.2xlarge instances with 8
vCPUs, 2.5 GHz, Intel Skylake P-8175; 32 GB of RAM, and
300 GB of SSD storage. All machines run a fresh installation
of Ubuntu 18.04. We did not observe any safety violations.
8 Related Work
There are two typical approaches to testing distributed sys-
tems. The first approach is to offer strong guarantees by build-
ing a fully verified system from the ground up [19, 27], or to
show the absence or presence of bugs [12, 13, 22, 30] by ex-
haustively enumerating the space of system behaviors [6, 31]
under systematically injected faults [3].
Fully verified systems do not scale to systems deployed in
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the real world. Model checking and exhaustive enumeration
of distributed system faults (especially, Byzantine arbitrary
behavior) leads to state explosion (despite partial order re-
duction techniques [15]), resulting in low performance. This
motivates the second approach of random testing, which un-
derlies the discipline of Chaos Engineering, exemplified by
systems like Chaos Monkey [25]. The main idea is to test the
resiliency of a distributed system by randomly injecting faults
(e.g., terminating processes). Jepsen [16] is a blackbox testing
framework that runs processes with a random, auto-generated
workload and randomly injected network partitions. A related
approach is to subject the system being evaluated to trials
by fire such as Cosmos Game of Stakes [14], i.e., financially
incentivizing the community to attack the test network, and
analyzing successful attacks to harden the network. Random
testing is effective and scalable—but it is not comprehensive
or reproducible, and cannot be used to evaluate distributed
systems in an ongoing fashion.
Prior work (with the exception of Jepsen, a random test-
ing framework) has focused on crash faults. Twins is a new,
principled approach to test BFT systems by emulating Byzan-
tine behavior via twins—copies of ‘compromised’ nodes that
can send duplicate or conflicting messages. Twins advances
state-of-the-art in two ways. First, it provides a framework to
systematically generate tests with configurable coverage, and
only modeling correct executions (thus avoiding the state ex-
plosion problem associated with formal methods). We show
with extensive evaluations (Section 7) that Twins is suitable
for evaluating real-world systems, and can be scaled up arbi-
trarily for larger test coverage. The second contribution of
Twins is to characterize what we call a ‘white glove’ testing
approach—occupying the middle ground between existing
black-box and white-box testing approaches. Twins can au-
tomatically generate unit tests that modify the interaction of
components with the environment (unlike black-box testing),
without opening the code (as in white-box testing).
9 Future Work & Conclusion
This paper presented Twins, a novel approach to systemati-
cally test BFT systems. The new approach provides coverage
for many, but not all, Byzantine attacks. The paper demon-
strated anecdotal evidence of coverage with respect to several
known Byzantine attacks, and an implementation of Twins
for LibraBFT that exposes misconfiguration and purposely
injected logical bugs within minutes. Many directions are left
open for future extensions.
Theory of Twins coverage. As mentioned in the Introduc-
tion, it is left open to rigorously characterize the attacks that
Twins can cover. In particular, we conjecture that Twins cov-
ers all Byzantine behaviors in a class of protocols that have
‘full disclosure’: each message includes a reference to its en-
tire causal past and any source of non-determinism (such as
local coin flips), and nodes act deterministically according to
their causal past. It would seem that this class of protocols
is fully covered by Twins since the only possible attack by
Byzantine nodes is to select different subsets of messages
to report to different targets. Similarly, we conjecture that
Twins can cover timing violations in a class of ‘lock-step’
synchronous protocols.
Additional Twins mechanisms. As mentioned in the “Limi-
tations” part of the Introduction, for other classes of protocols,
it is left open to increase the coverage of the Twins approach.
One potential extension is to cover more Byzantine behaviors
that do not adhere to ‘full disclosure’. Another extension is
to cover timing violations.
Checking additional properties. A different dimension for
extension is the type of guarantees which Twins tests. While
this paper focused squarely on safety of the core consen-
sus protocol, the Twins testing approach can be extended
to test ancillary components of BFT systems. For example,
LibraBFT switches to a new set of nodes by committing a
special block that includes the new set of nodes and signals
the reconfiguration event. It would be useful to investigate if
Twins can cause a safety violation by creating an inconsistent
node change (i.e., parts of the network believe in different
nodes). Similarly, LibraBFT’s smart contract execution en-
gine is re-instantiated via a similar mechanism, and can be
subjected to a similar Twins-based attack.
Extending Twins implementation. With respect to the con-
crete LibraBFT Twins implementation presented in Section 6,
several extensions are left for future work, including: (i) tack-
ling more than a pair of twins; (ii) detecting liveness viola-
tions; and (iii) implementing process-level twins over TCP/IP.
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A LibTwins Implementation of Test Executor
and Test Generator
This section provides the Rust code for the two main functions
of Twins, execute_test and test_generator. The code
listings in Figure 5 and Figure 6 present simplified Twins
interfaces, i.e., we omit Rust-specific features such as explicit
typing, details of error messages returned, de-referencing, and
managing variable ownership.
The test executor, implemented by execute_scenario (Fig-
ure 5), executes test cases generated by the test generator. This
function takes as input the number of nodes and twins, and
the leaders and partitions for each round. It creates a network
with the given inputs, and starts running the protocol until
the nodes have emitted a given number of messages, which
approximate the number of rounds for which the protocol has
been run.
The execute_scenario function exposes a simple interface,
abstracting complex underlying network and SMR config-
urations. To demonstrate the simplicity and flexibility of
execute_scenario, we show how to implement a simple test
(Figure 6) where no quorum can be formed, and therefore
no block gets committed. We set up a network with 4 hon-
est nodes (n0,n1,n2,n3), and 1 twin (twin0). We split the
network into two partitions {n0, twin0,n1} and {n1,n3}. For
each round n0, twin0 (in partition 1) and n3 (in partition 2)
are leaders. We then run the protocol for enough rounds (at
least 3 in LibraBFT) to get a commit on a block. In partition
1, both n0 and twin0 propose different blocks for the same
rounds. n1 will only vote for one of the two proposals be-
cause the second proposal is for a round that is not greater
than its last_voted_round (Safety rule 1, Section 5). The
fn execute_scenario(
num_nodes , // number of nodes
target_nodes , // the nodes for which to create twins
round_partitions , // Vector of partitions for each
round
round_leaders // Vector of leaders for each round
) {
let runtime = consensus_runtime();
let playground = NetworkPlayground::new(runtime.
handle());
// Start nodes and twins
let nodes = SMRNode::start_num_nodes_with_twins(
num_nodes ,
&target_nodes ,
&playground ,
round_proposers
);
// Create partitions
create_partitions(&playground , round_partitions);
// Start running the protocol and sending messages
block_on(async move {
let proposals = playground
.wait_for_messages(2, NetworkPlayground::
proposals_only::<TestPayload >)
.await;
// Pull enough votes to get a commit on the first
block
let votes: Vec<VoteMsg > = playground
.wait_for_messages(num_nodes * num_of_rounds ,
NetworkPlayground::votes_only::<
TestPayload >))
.collect();
});
// Check that the branches are consistent at all
heights
let all_branches = vec![];
for i in 0..nodes.len() {
nodes[i].commit_cb_receiver.close();
let node_commits = vec![];
while let node_commit_id = nodes[i].
commit_cb_receiver.try_next() {
node_commits.push(node_commit_id);
}
all_branches.push(node_commits);
}
assert!(is_safe(all_branches));
// Stop all nodes
for each_node in nodes {
each_node.stop();
}
}
Figure 5: The execute_scenario function which executes test cases.
second partition does not have enough nodes to form quorum.
Consequently, no blocks are committed.
B Detailed Safety Attack on Zyzzyva
We present a summary of Zyzzyva, and use Twins to rein-
state a known safety attack [1] on Zyzzyva [18]. We use the
notation described in Section 2.
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fn twins_no_quorum_test() {
let runtime = consensus_runtime();
let playground = NetworkPlayground::new(runtime.
handle());
let num_nodes = 4;
// 4 honest nodes
let n0 = 0, n1 = 1, n2 = 2, n3 = 3;
// twin of n0
let twin0 = node_to_twin.get(n0);
// twin of n1
let twin1 = node_to_twin.get(n1);
// Index #s of nodes for which we will create twins
let target_nodes = vec![0];
// Specify round leaders
let round_leaders = HashMap::new();
for i in 1..10 {
// Insert (n0, twin0 , n3) as leaders for round i
round_leaders.insert(i, vec![n0, twin0 , n3]);
}
// Specify round partitions
let round_partitions = HashMap::new();
for r in 0..10 {
// Insert partitions for round r
round_partitions.insert(
r,
vec![
vec![n0, twin0 , n1],
vec![n2, n3],
],
);
}
execute_scenario(
num_nodes ,
&target_nodes ,
&round_partitions ,
&round_leaders
);
}
Figure 6: Twins ‘No Quorum’ test.
B.1 Summary of Zyzzyva
Zyzzyva is an SMR protocol in the same settings as LibraBFT
(partial synchrony and n = 3 f +1). It operates in a view-by-
view manner. Each view has a designated leader. Nodes vote
on the leader proposal if they consider it valid (we describe the
validity criteria below, which has a flaw that enables the safety
attack). A commit decision on the leader proposal forms in
either of two tracks, fast and two-phase. In the fast track,
all n nodes vote for the leader proposal to commit it. In the
two-phase track, 2 f +1 nodes form a commit-certificate (CC),
then 2 f +1 nodes vote for the CC to commit the proposal.
At the beginning of the view, nodes send the new leader
a signed NEW-VIEW status message. The leader’s first pro-
posal carries the status of 2 f +1 nodes at the beginning of the
view to prove the proposal validity. The (flawed) definition in
Zyzzyva for a valid proposal upon view change is as follows.
For each sequence slot:
• Validity Rule 1 The leader picks among the states of
2 f +1 nodes, the CC from the highest view, if one exists.
• Validity Rule 2 Otherwise, the leader picks a proposal
that has f +1 votes from the highest view, if one exists.
• Validity Rule 3 Finally, if none of the above exist, the
leader creates a Nil proposal.
The flaw is to prioritize Validity Rule 1 over Validity Rule
2, which causes the leader to prefer CC even if generated in a
lower view than f +1 votes.
B.2 Safety Attack on Zyzzyva
The Zyzzyva flawed scenario safety demonstrated in [1] goes
through a succession of three views. In the first view, a faulty
leader generates conflicting proposals v1,v2 and splits honest
nodes between f + 1 that vote for v1 and f that vote for v2.
The faulty leader gathers a CC on v1 but does not send it to
other nodes. In the second view, a good leader adopts v2 and
drives agreement in the fast track. In the third view, f faulty
nodes join the f +1 honest nodes that voted for v1 in the first
view. They send the leader a CC for v1, hence the protocol
proceeds with v1, in conflict with the v2 commit. The attack
on Zyzzyva needs only n = 4 nodes, of which f = 1 is faulty,
and it is fairly easy to re-instate using the Twins framework.
There are four nodes, (D,E,F,G). To model the case that D
is Byzantine, it has a twin D′ initialized with different input.
We drive the execution creating partitions and electing leaders
at each step, according to the attack described above. We
describe below the detailed attack using Twins.
Step 1 Initialize D and D′ with different inputs v1 and v2.
Step 2 During View 1:
• Create the following partitions: P1 = {D,E,F},
P2 = {D′,G}.
• Let D run as leader for one round. D proposes v1
to P1 and gathers votes from P1 creating a CC.
• Create the following partitions: P1 = {E,F}, P2 =
{D′,G}, P3 = {D}.
• As a result, D does not get to share CC on v1 with
E and F .
• Similarly, for one round let D′ propose v2 to P2 and
gather votes from P2.
Step 3 Delay all messages until a new view starts. View 2:
• Create the following partitions: P1 = {D′,E,G},
P2 = {D,F}.
• Run G as leader, and let it collect (NEW-VIEW)
messages from D′ and E. Using Validity Rule 2
(Appendix B.1), G decides to propose for v2.
• Remove all partitions, i.e., P = {D,D′,E,F,G}.
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• G proposes v2, and collects votes from everyone.
This leads to a commit of v2.
Step 4 Delay all further messages until new view starts. View
3:
• Create the following partitions: P1 = {D,E,F},
P2 = {D′,G}.
• Run E as leader, and collect (NEW-VIEW) mes-
sages from D and F . Note that D sends the CC
on v1 (from view 1) to E. Using Validity Rule 1
(Appendix B.1), E decides to propose v1.
• E proposes v1 to P1, and gathers votes from D, E
and F (who empty their local logs, undoing v2).
This leads both E and F to commit v1, a safety
violation.
C Detailed Liveness Attack on FaB
We present a summary of FaB, and use Twins to reinstate
a known liveness attack on FaB [1]. We use the notation
described in Section 2.
C.1 Summary of FaB
FaB is a single-shot consensus protocol for the partial syn-
chrony setting with n = 3 f +1.7
A precursor to Zyzzyva, FaB is a view-based protocol with
an optimistic fast track. A leader drives a decision in the
fast track if all nodes vote for it, and in the two-phase track
if 2 f +1 nodes vote for a (2 f +1) commit-certificate (CC).
When a new leader is elected, it picks a valid proposal that
does not conflict with neither f + 1 votes nor a CC in the
previous view.
C.2 Liveness Attack on FaB
The (flawed) selection criterion above leads an execution
in the following scenario to become stuck. A faulty leader
equivocates and proposes v1,v2 to 2 f +1 and f honest nodes,
respectively. In transitioning to the next view, there is a
commit-certificate for v1 and f + 1 votes for v1 (including
an equivocation by one faulty), hence neither is safe, and
the new leader is stuck. The attack on FaB needs only n = 4
nodes, of which f = 1 is faulty, and it can be easily re-instated
using Twins. There are four nodes, (A,B,C,D) with D as a
Byzantine node, for which we create a twin D′ initialized with
different input. We describe below the attack using Twins.
Step 1 Initialize D and D′ with different inputs v1 and v2.
7FaB is actually designed for a parameterized model with n = 3 f +2t+1,
with safety guaranteed against f Byzantine failures and fast track guaranteed
against t. For brevity and uniformity, we ignore t here and set t = 0.
Step 2 During View 1:
• Create the following partitions: P1 = {A,B,D},
P2 = {C,D′}
• Run D as leader for one round. D proposes v1 to
P1 which decides to vote on v1.
• Insert the following rule in P1: (B,D)→ A. That
is, the only messages allowed are those from B and
D, to A.
• D, A and B send their votes which only reach A.
Thus, only A produces a CC for v1.
• Meanwhile, the leader D′ proposes v2 to P2.
Step 3 Delay all further messages until new view starts. Cre-
ate the partitions: {A,C,D′}, {B,D}. Let the new leader
A collect NEW-VIEW status messages from P1. These
status messages block A from proposing both v1 and v2
due to the FaB proposal validity rule. The rule states
that a proposal is valid if it does not conflict with neither
f +1 votes nor a CC in the previous view, which is not
the case for v1 (has a CC) and v2 (has f + 1 votes) as
described below:
• From A, the NEW-VIEW message contains the
value v1, and a CC for it.
• From C, the NEW-VIEW message contains the
value v2, and no CC.
• From D′, the NEW-VIEW message contains the
value v2, and no CC.
D Detailed Liveness Attack on Sync HotStuff
We present a summary of Sync HotStuff, and use Twins to re-
instate the force-locking attack [24] on a preliminary version
of Sync HotStuff (which was fixed in an updated version).
We use the notation described in Section 2.
D.1 Summary of Sync HotStuff
The preliminary version of Sync HotStuff [2] is an SMR
solution in the synchronous model with n = 2 f +1 parties.8
In synchronous protocols like Sync HotStuff, nodes exe-
cute the protocol in terms of ∆, which is the known bound
assumed on maximal network transmission delay. Sync Hot-
Stuff operates in a view-by-view regime —in each view there
is a designated leader which proposes values to nodes. If a
node accepts the proposed value, it broadcasts its vote. A
node creates a commit certificate (CC) for a proposed value if
it receives f +1 votes on it. Nodes track the highest CC, and
8The description here covers the first of three variants in that paper; two
other variants are designed for slightly different synchrony assumptions, but
the attacks on them are similarly covered by the Twins approach.
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only vote on a proposed value if it: (i) extends the highest CC
known to the node, and (ii) does not equivocate another value
proposed for the same height.
A node creates and broadcasts a blame against a leader: (i)
if the leader does not propose a value for 3∆, or (ii) the leader
proposes an equivocating value. If a node observes f + 1
blames against the leader in the current view, it broadcasts the
f +1 blames, then waits ∆ (to allow the blames to reach all
honest nodes), and moves to the new view. In the new view, it
immediately sends the new leader the highest CC it knows of.
After a view change, the new leader waits for ∆ to receive
node status messages (carrying the highest CC known to
them). The leader then proposes a value that extends the
highest CC from among the received status messages. Nodes
proceed in the new view as previously described.
D.2 Implementing Synchrony Attacks in
Twins
Due to the synchronous settings and the nature of the attack
which heavily leverages synchrony assumptions, in this case a
Twins scheduler must control message delivery timing. More
precisely, rather than only specifying whether a message is
delivered to a party or dropped, attacks on synchronous pro-
tocols require the Twins scheduler to deliver messages to
specific parties at specified times. While this is captured by
the Twins approach, our current implementation (Section 6)
does not support this feature (this will be implemented in
future Twins extensions).
Generally, we expect that the granularity of the scheduler
timing can be fairly coarse. In particular, there is a known
parameter ∆, the bound presumed by the algorithm on mes-
sage transmission delays and hard-coded into it. Indeed, the
force-locking attack needs to deliver messages at 0.5∆ incre-
ments, e.g., at times 0,0.5∆,∆,1.5∆,2.0∆, ... Therefore, a
Twins network emulator could operate in discrete lock-step
at 0.5∆ increments. With this capability in place, the force-
locking attack can be re-instated in the Twins approach as
described below.
D.3 Safety Attack on Sync HotStuff
We now rebuild the force-locking attack on the preliminary
version of Sync HotStuff using Twins. The crux of the attack
is for a faulty leader to generate a last-minute proposal that
reaches only half of the honest nodes. The other half trigger
a view change, and now the system becomes split. The first
half continues to commit the first leader proposal with “help”
from Byzantine nodes. The second half starts a new view and
fork the chain. This attack can be reinstated with Twins using
5 nodes (A,B,C,D,E), of which (A,B) are faulty and have
twins (A′,B′).
Notation. We extend the notation described in Section 2 to
capture message transmission in the synchronous setting as
follows: St v−→ S′t ′ denotes the transmission of a value v from a
set of nodes S that generate the value at time t, to a set of nodes
S′ that receive the value at time t ′. If a value is broadcast, we
use the ? symbol instead of a set: For example, St V−→ ? means
that S broadcasts a value v at time t. Additionally, to highlight
the ‘send’ or ‘receive’ action on a value, we use bold text on
the left or right side of the arrow, respectively. For example,
St v−→ S′ means that S sends v to S′ (message arrival time is
not known).
To reinstate this attack with Twins, we deploy 5 nodes
(A,B,C,D,E), of which (A,B) are faulty and have twins
(A′,B′). Here, n = 5, f = 2, and quorum size is 3 (since
synchronous BFT protocols tolerate f Byzantine nodes for
n = 2 f + 1). We describe below the detailed attack using
Twins.
At time 1.5∆ :
• A is the leader, and broadcasts a proposal with delay=
∆ for the value v1 which extends v0.
(A)1.5∆
propose(v1)−−−−−−→ ?
At time 2.5∆ :
• C receives V1, and broadcasts its vote.
(A)1.5∆
propose(v1)−−−−−−→ (C)2.5∆
(C)2.5∆
vote(v1)−−−−→ ?
At time 3∆ :
• D blames A since it did not receive a proposal from A
within 3∆. Twins (A′,B′) also did not receive a pro-
posal from A, hence they also blame with A. (D,A′,B′)
broadcast their blames with delay = 0, receive f +1
blames from each other, and start waiting for ∆.
(D,A′,B′)3∆
blame(A)−−−−−→ ?
(D,A′,B′)3∆ blame(A)−−−−−→ (D,A′,B′)3∆
At time 3.5∆ :
• D receives C’s vote on v1, but it cannot create a CC
on v1 since it has less than f +1 votes.
(C)2.5∆
vote(v1)−−−−→ (D)3.5∆
• (A,B) broadcast their votes on v1, which arrive at C
with delay 0. As a result, C gathers f +1 votes on v1
and creates CC(v1).
(A,B)3.5∆
vote(v1)−−−−→ ?
(A,B)3.5∆
vote(v1)−−−−→ (C)3.5∆
At time 4∆ :
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• C receives f + 1 blame messages from (D,A′,B′),
broadcasts all blame messages, and starts waiting for
∆.
(D,A′,B′)3∆ blame(A)−−−−−→ (C)4∆
(C)4∆
blame(A)−−−−−→ ?
• D has waited for ∆ since it quit the old view w with
leader A, so it starts the next view w+1 and sends its
highest commit certificate CC(V0) along with f + 1
blames on A to the next leader B, with delay = 0.
(D)4∆
CC(v0),blame(A)−−−−−−−−−→ (B)4∆
• The new leader B receives CC(v0) from D and f +
1 blames on A, and broadcasts a proposal for value
v1′ extending V0. Note that B does not know about
CC(v1).
(D)4∆
CC(v0),blame(A)−−−−−−−−−→ (B)4∆
(B)4∆
propose(v1 ′)−−−−−−−→ ?
• D receives the proposal v1′ from B, and broadcasts its
vote with delay ∆, then it sets its commit timer to 2∆
and starts counting down.
(B)4∆
propose(v1 ′)−−−−−−−→ (D)4∆
(D)4∆
vote(v1 ′)−−−−−→ ?
At time 4.5∆ :
• D receives votes on v1 from (A,B); as it has now gath-
ered f +1 votes on v1 it creates CC(v1). However, this
certificate is too late, as we will see in the following
steps.
(A,B)3.5∆
vote(v1)−−−−→ (D)4.5∆
At time 5∆ :
• C has waited for ∆ since it quit the old view with
leader A, so it starts the next view w+1 and sends its
highest certificate CC(v1) to the new leader B.
(C)5∆
CC(v1)−−−−→ (B)
• C receives D’s vote on v1′ but does not vote since v1′
(which extends CC(v0)) does not extend its highest
certificate CC(V1).
(D)4∆
vote(v1 ′)−−−−−→ (C)5∆
At time 6∆ :
• D commits v1′ since it finished waiting for 2∆ and
observed no equivocation or blame in the view w+1.
However, D’s highest certificate is CC(v1) (see time
4.5∆).
• Now if the current leader B goes offline, this will result
in a view change to view w+ 2 and the new leader
will extend the blockchain from the highest certificate
from the previous view, CC(v1). But D has committed
v1′ conflicting with v1, hence safety is violated.
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